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Abstract
With the continuous tensions over the financial transaction tax (FTT) in the European 
Union (EU), it is necessary to research the Tobin tax and the proposal of the Commission 
for a FTT in the EU. This paper shows that the FTT should be introduced in the EU for 
multiple reasons. There are three contentious issues in the literature with regard to the FTT 
that were explored in this paper: the effects of a FTT on price volatility, its effects on specula-
tion, and its feasibility. My research of the academic work shows that the counter-arguments 
are mostly academic in nature and pale in comparison with the benefits such a tax could 
offer. I expanded on this and elaborated why, outside of scholarly debate, the FTT is a good 
idea that should be realized, and why it will most certainly offer great benefits to the EU in 
the long run.
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In the wake of the financial crisis that came over the world in 2008 an old idea was 
revived in the European Union (EU) when Herman Von Rompuy, the President of the 
EU Council and José Manuel Durão Barroso, the President of the European Commission, 
officially requested that, “the introduction of a global financial transaction tax should be 
explored and developed further in that context” by the G20 during the summit in Toronto 
in June 2010 (“EU urges G20,” 2012). For political reasons and due to the resistance of the 
United States and the UK, no progress was made in Toronto in this regard, and the European 
Union found itself in a position where it either had to go at it alone or let the idea go. On 
September 28, 2011 Barroso gave his second annual state of the Union address. In it he advo-
cated a financial transaction tax for the European Union to cope with the current financial 
crisis. As mentioned before, the idea of such a tax is not new. It was John Maynard Keynes 
(2009) who, in the wake of the Great Depression, first proposed that “the introduction of 
a substantial government transfer tax on all transactions might prove the most serviceable 
reform available with the view to mitigate the predominance of speculation…” (p. 133). 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the following extreme exchange rate 
swings motivated James Tobin, a Keynesian economist and winner of the Nobel Prize in 
Economics, to adopt the idea and apply it to the foreign exchange market. He first laid out 
the details of his idea in 1974 in “The New Economics, One Decade Older” and four years 
later in his “Proposal for International Monetary Reform”. In his eyes the problem was that 
goods and labor are not as mobile as financial flows, and that governments had lost autonomy 
and influence with the growth of the financial markets and the now floating exchange 
rates. Therefore, “some sand [should be thrown] in the wheels of our excessively efficient 
international money market” (Tobin, 1974, pp. 520-521). The “sand” Tobin proposed was 
“an internationally agreed uniform tax, say 1%, on all spot conversions of one currency into 
another” (p. 89). 
The Tobin tax was never implemented but the idea tends to be revived in situations 
when turbulences in the financial markets cause crises that in turn give rise to the demand 
that financial institutions must be kept in check, for example in the late 1990’s after the Asian 
financial crisis. It does not come as a surprise that the idea was again exhumed in the wake 
of the 2008 crash because it caused the same type of sentiment and fears about financial 
markets. This time, however, the Tobin tax actually has a chance at being attempted for the 
first time. Therefore, it has been debated vehemently, especially since the European Com-
mission has submitted its proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT)1. Where Tobin’s 
version of the tax was one on short-term financial transactions, the proposition that is being 
considered in the EU at the moment is different: It aims at a larger tax base and does not 
distinguish between short and long-term transactions, “Thus the scope covers instruments 
which are negotiable on the capital market, money market instruments […], units or shares 
in collective investment undertakings […] and derivative agreements […]”and also covers 
over-the-counter-trades by financial institutions such as pension funds, hedge funds, insur-
ance companies, banks, etc. Excluded from the FTT are private transactions by citizens and 
companies as well as transactions of the European Central Bank and governments so that the 
tax does not interfere with the capital-raising potential of governments. The Commission 
proposes a tax rate of at least 0.1 percent on stocks and bonds and 0.01 percent on derivatives 
1 Please note: the term “Tobin tax” is used for various types of financial transaction taxes and can often be found in 
the context of the FTT, but for the sake of accuracy and consistency with EU usage, the term financial transactions 
tax (FTT) will be used in this paper.
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(“Proposal for a Council Directive,” 2011).
Since the Commission’s proposal, the topic has been a hot button issue among govern-
ments inside and outside of Europe, the media and the public. The scholarly debate reaches 
back to the original Tobin tax, and deals with three main points of contention. In the fol-
lowing, these three points will be explored, pro and counter arguments will be presented and 
conclusions will be offered if possible. Furthermore, it will be laid out beyond the scholarly 
debate why and how Europe in its current situation needs a FTT. 
1. The effect of a transactions tax on price volatility
One of the main objectives James Tobin had in mind in the 1970’s was to address ex-
cessive price volatility, but the question whether a financial transaction tax would actually 
decrease or increase volatility could not be answered with certainty. There are essentially two 
views of the issue: Proponents argue that a FTT would decrease price volatility in financial 
markets (Summers & Summers, 1989, p. 170). They see an excess in short-term trading in the 
financial markets and consider it to be destabilizing as, “in the absence of any consensus on 
fundamentals, the markets are dominated…like those for gold, rare paintings, and…yes, often 
equities…by traders in the game of guessing what other traders are going to think” (Tobin, 
1974, p. 158). It is necessary to distinguish short-term, and medium, and long-term volatility 
because, as Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller, and Picek (2008) explain, it is short-term specula-
tion that causes deviations of the equilibrium asset prices in the long-run. A FTT would 
curb short-term speculation and thus stabilize the financial market. The dynamics of how 
a FTT could achieve this will be explained later on. Frank H. Westerhoff and Dieci (2006), 
researchers on the effects of such a tax on volatility, explored “the effectiveness of Keynes-
Tobin transaction taxes when heterogeneous agents can trade in different markets”. In other 
words, what happens if a tax is introduced in one of two markets? They found that the mar-
ket with the tax would be stabilized while the market without the tax would be destabilized. 
They concluded that this would put pressure on the second market to also introduce a trans-
action tax in order to compensate for the increased destabilization. Ehrenstein, Westerhoff, 
and Stauffer (2005) reproduced the same stabilizing effect in their work on “The Tobin Tax 
and Market Depth” but also noted that other models might lead to different conclusions. 
The counter argument is based on the idea that speculation is not destabilizing, and is 
here presented by Davidson (1998):
“Only when the spot price randomly strayed from the estimated statistical average 
would agents engage in arbitrage (speculators) by buying or selling in the spot market 
to move the price back towards its (known) statistical average. Thus in a CEE [a 
classical-ergodic economy in which the future can be predicted with statistical reli-
ability – as opposed to a Keynesian economy] speculation, to the extent it exists, is 
always stabilizing” (p. 647). 
Speculation is seen as vital for a functioning market because it provides liquidity. There is in 
fact a fear that a transaction tax could lead to a loss of liquidity which is not denied by the 
supporters of the tax (Summers & Summers, 1989). However, the study above assumes that 
the “future can be predicted with statistical reliability” which makes its findings questionable 
at best and not very helpful for real-life applications (Davidson, 1998, p. 646). 
Opponents are also convinced that speculation is needed to determine prices and to 
distribute risk through hedging (Schulmeister et al, 2008). The problem with this way of 
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arguing is that it does not offer any explanation for consistent deviations of prices from their 
equilibria. As Kenneth Rogoff (1996) points out: 
“How is it possible to reconcile the extremely high short-term volatility of real ex-
change rates with the glacial rate (15 percent per year) at which deviations from 
PPP seem to die out? It would seem hard to explain short-term volatility without a 
dominant role for shocks to money and financial markets. But given that such shocks 
should be largely neutral in the medium run it is hard to see how this explanation is 
consistent with a half-life for PPP deviations of three to five years” (p. 18). 
Hence, the claim that speculation cannot be destabilizing is highly questionable, especially 
in the face of events such as the current, the Mexican and the Asian financial crisis in all of 
which speculation played a major role.
Another aspect in the argument used to support the view that a Tobin-like tax would 
increase volatility is the role of market depth. It is feared that the tax would reduce trading 
volume which in turn could increase volatility because lower trading volumes are necessary 
to move prices if liquidity is decreased. In other words, the transaction cost would increase 
to a level that motivates traders to leave the market which decreases liquidity. Lower liquidity 
requires smaller trading volumes to move prices, and price volatility increases. This does not 
always have to be the case. Schöchli (2009) observes that in overly liquid markets it would 
have balancing and very beneficial outcomes.
This discourse should make clear that there is no consensus among scholars regarding 
the question of price volatility. Overall, it appears that there is more evidence in support of 
the perspective that the tax would reduce price volatility. Whether this is because proponents 
tend to research this topic more and use models that are more likely to produce results that 
support their view, or if this actually does mean that less volatility is a likely outcome, cannot 
be determined here. Instead, the conclusion has to be that a FTT could be stabilizing, or as 
the International Monetary Fund (2010) put it, “It is not always true that a FTT reduces 
market price volatility” (p. 20).
2. The effect of a transactions tax on speculation
Keynes (2009) differentiated between trading and speculation and regarded speculation 
as destabilizing. He was convinced that markets did not and could not work properly. Instead 
they were at the mercy of speculators who were driven by herd mentality that caused, “the 
instability [in the markets] due to the characteristic of human nature […] Most, probably, of 
our decisions to do something positive […] can only be taken as a result of animal spirits” 
(p. 134). 
One of Keynes’ most formidable opponents, Milton Friedman, held the belief that 
harmful speculation would be unprofitable and therefore does not exist. Other arguments 
range from the view that the real and the derivatives market are equally important, as pre-
sented by Riggs and Velk (1999) to the worry that a FTT might not be able to curb short-
term transactions while not affecting “productive” trading. 
Friedman’s thinking is based on the concept of arbitrage: speculators look for stock, 
financial instruments, etc. that are over- or underpriced. This is a situation that offers a pos-
sibility for profit-making, simply by buying in the market where it is underpriced and selling 
it where it is more expensive. Hereby, the arbitrageur assures that prices, ceteris paribus, are 
always the same in different markets. Arbitrage is the reason why for example gold in the 
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exchange in London always costs the same as it does in New York. That it does not always 
work that way can be seen with the example of the so-called carry trades that stand in sharp 
contrast to exchange rate theory. By definition arbitrage is risk-free, whereas carry trades al-
ways involve risk (Jylhä, Suominen, & Lyytinen, 2008). For a carry trade money is borrowed 
in a market with low interest rates and invested in a market with high interest rates with the 
expectation that the exchange rate in the first market appreciates. Hence, it is not arbitrage. 
Arbitrage would lead us to think that the expected results are equalized returns across all 
markets (Schulmeister et al., 2008). Friedman’s thinking may still be omnipresent but reality 
has proven his theory that speculation cannot be destabilizing wrong many times. Recogniz-
ing this fact does not take an economics degree but only common sense and a clear view of 
the events in 2008 and similar financial meltdowns. 
With their claim that derivatives and goods markets are equally important, Riggs and 
Velks (1999) apparently decided to rid themselves of Adam Smith and the most fundamen-
tal basics of classical economics. One essential insight of the classical economists was that 
real values make a society wealthy, not money. Derivatives can be understood like a tower 
of derived, artificially created values built on top of a real value such as a house. That not 
all derivatives can be backed by real values one to one, becomes immediately apparent by 
the fact that derivatives trading is approximately 50 times world GDP. This number is even 
higher for the EU where it amounted to 84 times GDP in 2006 (Schulmeister et al., 2008). 
Therefore, both markets are not equally important because only one produces real values 
that back to some degree the derivatives of the second market. The US subprime crisis is the 
ideal example to stress how important this distinction is, and what the consequences are if 
derivatives are not backed sufficiently by real values.
The third argument, the question whether it is possible to target harmful speculation 
while not affecting “regular” trading, is an important concern and one that is among the 
most hotly debated. What makes this argument so important is the interconnectedness of 
the financial market and instruments traded in it. The Commission agrees with this assess-
ment: “In reality, it has become extremely difficult to make a meaningful and operational 
distinction between speculative and non-speculative transactions” (“Proposal for a Council 
Directive,” 2008). It is becoming increasingly complicated to determine what are short and 
what are long-term instruments, what is backed by real values and what is not or to what 
degree. And even if some questions can be answered, this still might not necessarily offer a 
clear case for the speculative character of the instrument. Keeping up with financial innova-
tion is a daunting if not impossible task, and if only certain types of instruments are taxed, a 
requirement would be that someone who is able to understand the ever new and improved 
instruments classifies them in order to determine the appropriate tax rate. This is even more 
questionable as the subprime crisis has shown that there are very few that have a full grasp 
of what exactly the instruments are that they are trading. Could these elites be recruited to 
regulate the source of their fortunes, their own companies, their bread and butter? Maybe so, 
but the creation of an elite group of highly qualified specialists that are capable of regulating 
financial instruments and also enforce these regulations would have to become a priority 
during the process.
3. The feasibility of a transactions tax
When James Tobin first proposed the Tobin tax in the 1970’s the question of how it 
would be technically feasible to tax transactions in the foreign exchange market was a very 
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problematic concern. Today, in the digital age of the internet and high centralization of the 
financial markets with the use of clearing and settlement systems, the technical side should 
no longer pose a serious problem. Furthermore, it is estimated that the administrative cost of 
levying a FTT should be comparably very low (“Proposal for a Council Directive,” 2008).
A common counter argument in the context of technical feasibility of a FTT is the 
concern that it might lead to tax evasion. First, evasion from taxable to non-taxable transac-
tions, and second, a flight of speculators to other markets and offshore tax havens (Reisen, 
2002). If the goal of implementing a transaction tax is not only to raise revenue but to stabi-
lize markets, the switch to non-taxable instruments is desirable. The same is true for the mi-
gration of certain types of speculators to different markets (i.e., those engaging in high-risk 
and thus destabilizing activities); in particular if Westerhoff ’s findings that the increased in-
stability in the second market could cause enough pressure for that market to also introduce 
a similar tax would prove to be correct. The migration of “noise traders” would obviously 
lead to less market depth and the risk that it might lead to more volatility as explained previ-
ously. Also, it needs to be stressed that the possibility of tax evasion simply cannot be used as 
a valid argument against levying a tax as it would necessarily lead to the logical necessity to 
abolish all taxes. 
What is completely lost in the current debate is the fact that financial transaction 
taxes are not quite as revolutionary as they may seem. Many countries have, or used to have 
(and disposed of them in the course of trade liberalization and globalization in the past 20 
years), some kind of taxation on financial transactions and/or capital. Seven out of the 27 
EU member states, Switzerland, and Japan have a capital duty of up to 1%. The same study 
shows that Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore, and China levy transfer taxes of up to 5%, 
which is far beyond the level the EU plans (Schulmeister et al., 2008). Interestingly, the UK 
has been imposing the so-called stamp duty of 0.5% of the sales price for a long time, and 
“added a new version to cope with sales of uncertificated stocks” (Beattie, 2011). How sig-
nificant the stamp duty is fiscally can be seen in the fact that in 2005 it amounted to 0.8% 
of GDP (Schulmeister et al., 2008). The FTT proposed by the Commission would extend 
the taxation to other sorts of instruments which the British government wants to prevent. 
Each country with a tax on financial transactions and/or capital offers an example for the 
reality that, and an example for how financial transactions and capital flows can in fact be 
taxed. The conclusion is therefore that neither the design of the FTT nor technical con-
cerns are hindrances. The actual hindrance appears to be political will and the real question 
is whether a FTT is politically, rather than technically, feasible. An answer will not be given 
in this paper as only time can tell. But in times of increasing influence of banks and other 
financial institutions over the political process, the success of a policy that would curb their 
profits is doubtful.
It has been shown that there are several unresolved issues regarding a financial transac-
tion tax among scholars: It cannot be determined with absolute certainty what effects a FTT 
would have on price volatility. The uncertain effect on market stability makes it necessary to 
introduce the tax at a low and sensible rate and then monitor its effects. Secondly, there is the 
issue of targeting speculative activities while assuring the proper functioning of the market. 
For this reason, a universal tax at a low rate is the preferred method. This way, short-term 
speculation could be targeted because of the shorter time horizon. In other words, both 
short-term and long-term transactions would be taxed. However, speculators who are in the 
market for short-term transactions would be affected much more than long-term investors 
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who would also have to pay but at such a low level (as they enter and leave the market only 
seldom) that it would not deter them from investing. For example, a tax as low as 0.05% 
would result in an annual tax burden of approximately 43% for someone who enters and 
leaves the market once each day (Westerhoff & Dieci, 2006). On the topic of tax evasion, the 
Commission has proposed to use the residence principle. This means, all transactions made 
by a company headquartered in the EU are subject to the tax, regardless of where they are 
conducted (“Proposal for a Council Directive,” 2008). 
Lastly, the technical and political feasibility were addressed, and it was concluded that 
while technical issues should not pose a significant problem, political will is likely the largest 
hurdle. This means that none of the issues discussed above can or should be taken as an argu-
ment to scrap the entire proposal, but they do make a good case for a careful and sensible 
introduction. While there are these points of contention that have been addressed the need 
to introduce a FTT in the EU can be substantiated even further.
Justification for the Proposal
According to Peter Hall (2010), Europe has seen three different economic periods after 
World War II: 30 years of embedded liberalism until around 1975, the transition of the 1970s, 
and neo-liberalism since the early 1980s. The neo-liberal period has been characterized by 
the challenge of job creation in the absence of adequate growth rates and increasing global 
competition. To address these issues policy makers moved away from active state intervention 
and, “toward the allocation of resources through markets […] and a shift away from the use 
of active demand management toward the use of supply-side policies” (Hall, 2010, p. 3). Ab-
delal (2006) believes that consequently, “the conventional accounts of the rise of a new era 
of global finance and a liberal regime to govern it are so widely credited that they constitute 
truisms for many scholars and policy makers” (p. 4). As a result, these past decades became an 
era of the sanctification of the markets. Governments lost power in favor of the markets, and 
the state’s financial authority was eroded. It is said that no person or institution could allocate 
resources more efficiently than the free market. If problems do arise they are said to be the 
result of intervention that, hence, give reason for further deregulation. Free markets, however, 
are a utopia. They do not and will never exist; and markets that are half-free do not produce 
free market results. What they produce instead can and does include market failure – defined 
by Slavin (2008) as the phenomenon that results when resources are not allocated efficiently. 
Resources will be allocated efficiently if certain assumptions are fulfilled: a) rational ex-
pectations b) perfect information c) no transaction costs. If these three points are met Pareto 
optimality will necessarily be achieved. It has long been assumed that conditions b) and c )
could most likely be found in financial markets but to what degree this is accurate will not 
be explored here. The assumption of rational expectations is the most crucial one and it suf-
fices to disqualify the idea that market failure plays no role in financial markets. The rational 
expectations assumption has, according to De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007), “now become 
the main building block of macroeconomic modeling, so much so that macroeconomic 
models without a microfoundation based on the rationality assumption are simply not taken 
seriously” (p. 1). 
It is apparent that common sense and every day experiences prove that people do not 
behave rationally. But there has also been research conducted to support that notion: Profes-
sor Ernst Fehr (2001), a renowned economist in the new field of behavioral finance at the 
University Zurich, has been conducting extensive research that shows that people com-
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mand in fact very limited rationality and will. He found that instead of only pursuing their 
self-interest, which rational behavior would demand, their actions are often influenced by 
different factors such as the desire for justice and fairness. The reason why speculators can-
not be considered rational agents is summed up in his poignant comment that, “someone 
who thinks the others are rational will not earn much” (Bernau, 2006)2. The conviction that 
people do not behave in accordance with the rational agent paradigm is further supported 
by the empirical work of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007). They recognize that, “a major 
shock to the theory [rational-expectations-efficient-market (REEM)] came when spectacu-
lar bubbles and crashes occurred in both the stock markets and in the foreign exchange mar-
kets […] and that other empirical anomalies have been discovered that invalidate the REEM 
model” (p. 2 - 5). Hence, the conditions for rational economic agents are not fulfilled which 
permits the argument that financial markets may become (and have been) subject to market 
failure. In accordance with Keynesian thinking, these market failures can be corrected or at 
least moderated by means of government intervention, ideally through fiscal policy (i.e., a 
financial transaction tax).
It is apparent that there are good theoretical economic reasons for a FTT but the pro-
posal to levy such a tax deals with the real world in its current situation. In the academic 
debate about the tax, the question of tax revenue has never played a major role, the reason 
being that taxes in economics are usually viewed as distortive forces in the market. However, 
the financial sector is subject to extremely low taxes and, “enjoys a tax advantage of approxi-
mately €18 billion per year because of VAT exemptions on financial services” (“Financial 
Transaction Tax,” 2011). This means that the market is already distorted because of the tax 
advantages the financial sector enjoys. Thus, relative prices are also already distorted in favor 
of the financial sector. In this case a FTT would be a corrective not a distortive force as it 
would lessen the distortive gap between the financial and the other sectors of the economy; 
relative prices would even out in proportion to the tax. 
If tax revenue has never played a role since Keynes’ proposal in 1936, why should it 
now? The German magazine Der Spiegel estimates that the crisis cost the global economy 
over $10 trillion which amounts to over $1500 per each person on the planet (“Studie: 
Finanzkrise kostet,” 2009). “As a result of the crisis, public debt in all 27 EU member states 
jumped from below 60% of GDP in 2007 to 80% for the years to come”, and it only keeps 
rising. EU member nations committed €4.6 trillion to bail out financial institutions in the 
course of this crisis and the question is if the externalities of the financial sector should not 
be internalized (“EIZ Niedersachsen,” 2011). Every new bailout for banks, every new rescue 
package for Greece, etc. all of this will translate into a higher burden the government and 
ultimately the tax payers have to carry. More tax revenue is urgently needed. 
With every new panicked last minute crisis aversion tactic, it becomes more apparent 
just how much power national governments have lost in the course of the deregulation of 
the financial markets in favor of financial institutions and how little control national gov-
ernments have at this point over banks, investment banks, hedge funds, etc. Already in 1986, 
Susan Strange considered the situation to be so urgent that she described the international 
financial system as a casino in which gamblers, “have got out of hand, almost beyond, it 
sometimes seems, the control of governments” (p. 21). In the 26 years since then this trend 
has not been reversed. Instead the erosion of the state’s financial authority has accelerated 
2 This is a translation of the comment E. Fehr made in the interview.
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and, as Strange (1997) points out, “with probably the sole exception of the United States 
(and possibly the Swiss Confederation), states are no longer able to resist the foreign ex-
change markets” (p. 369). Therefore it is crucial that governments use every tool at their 
disposal to regain some control. The price for the failure to do so is simply too high, as we 
have had to observe.
The preferential treatment of the financial sector also raises the question why an in-
dustry that causes such enormous costs for society at large should enjoy such beneficial 
tax treatment? The call for the “banks to pay their fair share” is becoming louder from the 
public, and within the EU it is also being uttered increasingly from politicians, in particular 
in Germany. The Commission stated that, “For the EU as a whole fiscal consolidation needs 
to restore sustainability could exceed EUR 800 billion in the next years” (“Proposal for a 
Council Directive,” 2011, p. 47). 
At the same time unemployment is high, people pay less taxes while the need for public 
services is increasing. Governments are in dire need of tax revenue. A FTT would enable the 
EU governments to increase their tax revenue significantly while calming the public outrage 
over the perceived injustice of preferential treatment for those who caused the crisis, and al-
leviating social tensions. It is estimated that levying a FTT could generate approximately €55 
billion per year in tax revenues (“José Manuel Durão Barroso”, 2011). It needs to be men-
tioned that it is very difficult to estimate the actual revenue because of the lack of experience 
with a tax of this type and secondly, because demand is likely to be highly elastic. Nonethe-
less, for a FTT, tax revenue would be substantial. According to the wishes expressed in the 
proposal of the Commission, tax revenues would be shared by the EU and the member states, 
it would be used to strengthen public finance, and it is badly needed in order to pay for the 
current crisis and build reserves for future crises (“Proposal for a Council Directive”, 2011).
While a FTT would generate significant revenues it would also offer a way to distribute 
risk more fairly. This means it would offer a way to return some of the risk speculators are 
taking in their trades to the financial institutions. For the functioning of the markets in the 
long-run this is crucial as it would be a measure to reduce moral hazard. If a child steals a 
cookie and is given a chocolate bar as a consequence of the theft, the child has a clear incen-
tive to go and steal more. In other words, there is the concern that banks for example begin 
to use the possibility of government bailouts in their strategic planning as they did not have 
to pay for their sins before. Therefore, they have an incentive to engage in more risky behav-
ior. A FTT would lower this moral hazard by redistributing the risk for highly speculative 
behavior back to those who engage in it, and thus lower the risk of an occurrence overall. 
A FTT would not only force financial institutions to contribute to the cost of eco-
nomic recovery while discouraging risky and unproductive trading, it would also lead to 
desirable social outcomes: A FTT would affect wealthier persons more, the reason being that 
people who have little or nothing cannot invest in the market, or invest in pension funds or 
similar things that would hardly be affected by a FTT because of their long time horizon 
(Mayert & Wegner, 2010).
Europe and the FTT
The FTT remains an unresolved issue in the EU. In January 2012 it led to a falling 
out between Great Britain and continental Europe, in particular with Merkel and Sarkozy, 
when the British Prime Minister Cameron refused to sign the fiscal compact because he 
was not granted an exemption for the city of London for the planned FTT, and by doing so 
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acted against a popular majority for the so-called Robin Hood tax (Poll). It has long been 
debated if a FTT could work without Europe’s largest and most significant financial center 
or if it would cause a much feared mass exodus of investors towards GB. London is after all 
one of the most important financial centers worldwide, and almost all main banks have their 
Eurozone headquarters there. This argument does not appear to have scared Sarkozy, and 
neither his successor François Hollande, as well as Merkel who appear determined to real-
ize the tax, with or without the cooperation from the island (“Sarkozy überzeugt Merkel,” 
2012). Should the tax be introduced in the entire Eurozone, France and Germany would 
be correct not to be too concerned, but only if the residence principle is realized because 
otherwise a massive activity shift from the financial markets of the continent towards London 
would occur. As, however, it is becoming increasingly more unlikely that all Euro countries 
will participate and the FTT is continuously being watered down, a successful introduc-
tion and realization is less and less likely. While a FTT appeared to be a realistic though not 
likely possibility when the Commission first proposed it, at this point, the decision for or 
against a FTT depends on the finance ministers and national governments which makes the 
introduction of a FTT highly doubtful. More and more compromises are debated such as 
the so-called financial activities tax, a tax on revenue and remunerations of financial institu-
tions. It will doubtlessly generate significant tax revenue but would neither curb high-risk 
speculation nor have any of the correcting properties in regard to the existing distortions in 
the financial markets. As political motives and incentives reign supreme, it can be presumed at 
this point that the FTT will be sacrificed in political scuffles and bargaining and a watered-
down compromise with questionable outcomes will be introduced. Political will remains as 
it always has been the touchstone of the issue.
Conclusion
Beyond the rhetoric of “Tax Against Poverty” (“Steuer Gegen Armut,” 2011) and 
“James Tobin’s ruinous idea” (“Review & Outlook,” 2011) it quickly becomes evident that 
a FTT is a viable and innovative option to increase tax revenue, all the while discouraging 
noise trading and risky behavior in the financial market. These points are uncontested. Is 
there a possibility of unwanted side effects? Is there uncertainty involved in its effects on the 
question whether some speculators will leave the taxed market? Certainly! The question that 
needs to be asked here is not how much would these speculators add to the volume in the 
market, but how much damage can be prevented by discouraging their high-risk behavior. A 
FTT will not solve global poverty, it will neither prevent future financial crises, nor stabilize 
the failing European member states! Economic collapses as well as debt crises involve com-
plex and complicated dynamics that cannot be solved with a small tax on financial transac-
tions. What a financial transaction tax can do is generate significant and much needed tax 
revenue, and it can reduce highly speculative transactions such as high-frequency trading. It is 
important to see the possibilities of the tax realistically. The FTT should be used as one tool 
among many in a serious effort to get the current crisis in the EU under control, and at this 
point the EU needs to take advantage of every possibility it has and must not be discouraged 
by the opponents. Nobody likes speed limits, producers do not like regulations, tax payers 
do not like taxes, and speculators do not like financial transaction taxes. Nonetheless we have 
them in order to protect the greater good.
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